At first glance, it is important to highlight that a general anathema strikes the coup d’État in principle, both at the level of doctrines and texts (1). The coup d’État perpetrated by the military in Niger on July 26, 2023, is not an exception. On that date, the elected President of Niger, Mohamed Bazoum, was held hostage by the presidential military guard. Forty-eight hours later, General Abdourahamane Tiani proclaimed himself as Head of State presiding over the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP).
This coup was widely condemned by international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, as well as heads of state and diplomats. Since then, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) has posed as the standard-bearer of the bloc protesting this coup d’État (2). Moreover, it is equally active in the implementation of sanctions in order to compel the restoration of constitutional order, with military withdrawal and the return of deposed presidents to power as its primary goals.
This ECOWAS approach to the coup d’État in Niger seems coherent if we understand that the legitimacy of those in power is now subordinated to the organization of free and transparent elections (3). Democracy, of which coup d’État is a breach, has become a universally adopted standard of political governance within states. In Africa, the African Union condemns unconstitutional changes of government in its Constitutive Charter and its various resolutions and declarations (4). Furthermore, the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, in addition to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Maintenance of Peace and Security, provides, among other things, that “all unconstitutional change is prohibited, as is any non-democratic mode of accession or maintenance to power” (5). If it is true, in classical theory, that the coup d’État is located at the antipodes of the democratic system claimed today by all the countries of the world and brings about a change of rulers ‘‘outside the constitutional procedures in force, by an action undertaken within the State itself at the level of its leaders or its agents” (6), it seems from contemporary doctrine that a coup d’état can become a necessity (7). The advocates of this recent doctrinal trend claim that this type of coup expresses the reactions of people who are disappointed by their rulers’ responses to classical issues of State management (democracy or social justice) or people who express current needs (such as security threatened by Jihadists).
Such coups should not be judged at the same level as those caused by the thirst for power, which is why they are sometimes tolerated by international organizations (8). However, this tolerance has become subjective in West Africa, with the passiveness of ECOWAS towards constitutional coups in the face of constitutional coups while selectively condemning coups. There thus arises a double problem of the equivalence and instrumentalization of coups d’état in West Africa. The situation in Niger confirms the rejection of an equivalence between military and constitutional coups d’état and the instrumentalization of this distinction for ulterior purposes.
- The unjustified rejection of an equivalence between Military and Constitutional coups d’État
The coup d’État of July 26, 2023, in Niger is a call for concern for many reasons. First of all, this is the fourth ECOWAS coup in a span of two years, following those in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. This proliferation of coups is a regression compared to the democratic advances made in the member States of this organization (9) . Secondly, coups d’État are no longer unanimously condemned in West Africa, as member States are divided over the measures to be taken towards these unconstitutional government changes. Ultimately, coup plotters typically end up with the public’s support and successfully impose their agenda on ECOWAS in spite of the sanctions.
Moreover, a coup d’État is no longer a crime whose perpetrators are systematically isolated at the regional and even international scene. The complacency favoring military coups in particular is a result of laxity from sub-regional and regional organizations towards constitutional coups. The scenario remains almost the same: those in power manage public affairs for their personal interests and to the detriment of the suffering people. Knowing they cannot be re-elected by the people or have exhausted the number of mandates provided in the Constitution, they orchestrate its modification via fraudulent means in order to face this barely veiled legal coup not condemned by ECOWAS and the military ends up intervening.
Therefore, it is obvious that several military coups could have been avoided if constitutional coups were reported and sanctioned with the same vigor. The procedures to access political functions in West African States are stated in their constitutions, such that any violation of these rules must be classified as a coup d’État, bearing the same consequences. By ignoring this equivalence, ECOWAS is exploiting the untold distinction between a military coup and a constitutional coup.
II- The unacknowledged instrumentalization of the distinction between military and constitutional coups d’État
In the dynamics of coup d’État in West Africa, it is possible to observe a difference in treatment, even discrimination, between military and constitutional coups.
At first glance, it seems that only military coups attract convictions and sanctions, unlike constitutional coups, which are not subject to the same treatment in West Africa. However, two diametrically opposed camps have formed around the coup d’État in Niger, in an antagonism that does not rule out the military option. On analysis, the partisans of military intervention in Niger (10) intend to restore the democratically elected president, in opposition to the bloc of putschists and their allies in Mali and Burkina Faso, who rely on the idea of betrayal of the people through undemocratic management of power. From one position to the other, the perception of the two camps diverges and sometimes refers to a military coup d’état, sometimes to a constitutional coup d’État.
On the other hand, the promptness of international actors to sanction military coups rather than constitutional coups is indicative of the diversity of interests at stake. In Niger, as in other West African States, the rulers behind constitutional coups enjoy the trust of Western States and international organizations. Is this complacency not the counterpart of the interests held by these Western actors in West Africa? In any case, the military in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea would rather start over from scratch by severing all historical relationships their nations have ever had with specific Western powers. In doing so, new actors such as Russia and China have become involved to maintain the balance of power and defend their own interests. It is therefore obvious that behind each coup d’état there are divergent interests to defend. By granting differential treatment between military and constitutional coups, ECOWAS has opened the door to their instrumentalization. Under these conditions, negotiations for a return to constitutional order not only depend on the balance of power but also on the interests at stake.
Conclusion
Combine content with form in the approach to coups. It is no longer relevant to focus on the types of coups. Military coups have been labeled as ones that can be criticized simply because the military is not designed to rule. Constitutional coups, on the other hand, typically go unreported while occasionally having more devastating effects on the population. This form of coup d’État must be scrutinized with the greatest vigilance and punished with so much vigor. Any violation of the Constitution with the intent of acquiring or preserving power constitutes a coup d’État and should be met with the same outrage and sanction. Otherwise, military and civilian coups will always be carried out to put a stop to constitutional coups, whether they result in maintaining power in violation of the Constitution or running the State against the interests of the Nation. In this circumstance, few objective actors will be able to condemn the coup d’État.
Dr. Théophile NGUIMFACK VOUFO
Holder of a PhD/Ph.D in Public Law, option Public Finance, Dr. Nguimfack is currently Lecturer at the Faculty of Legal and Political Sciences of the University of Dschang.
