The Special Criminal Court and the repression of “white-collar crimes” in Cameroon – Prof. NGO TONG Chantal Marie

By Prof. NGO TONG Chantal Marie

The concept of “white-collar crime” was coined by the American sociologist Edwin Sutherland in 1939 with the aim of demonstrating that the elites, whether political, economic, or financial, engage in criminal activity that is just as organized as that of traditionally known criminal circles (the mafia, drug cartels, etc.) and poses a significant threat to social order and stability. Long overlooked in scientific studies, and more specifically criminological research, since Sutherland’s research, white-collar crime has become a relevant and timely subject. Its study offers an opportunity to revitalize the discussion and, in particular, to address the issue of criminal procedures and sanctions to be applied to white-collar criminals.

Introduction

The term “white-collar crime” was first used by Edwin Sutherland in 1939, referring to the illegal activities of people of a higher socioeconomic status, in connection with the normal exercise of their functions. A white-collar crime is defined as a financial motivated offense, a crime committed by people of high social status, exploiting their position and power within professional or institutional frameworks. In 1970, André Normandeau attempted to establish a typology of white-collar crimes. Among other white-collar crimes, he distinguishes the illegal economic practices of mining, manufacturing, and commercial companies; tax fraud; the various forms of embezzlement in the exercise of a profession or government office; and the corruption of public officials, which Charles Wright Mills called “structural immorality“, resulting from the erosion of codes and values of integrity, an erosion that leaves a significant moral void. This also includes crime committed by public officials, characterized by corruption, overbilling in public procurement, fictitious contracts, the issuance of false certificates, and a black market. The primary criterion for identifying the perpetrators of this crime is their social background and status the “white-collar” class. Jean-François Gayraud defines “white-collar criminals” as the political, economic, or financial elites who, in the course of their duties, commit crimes that are inherently invisible: corruption, insider trading, fraud, etc. The scale of these crimes demonstrates that the elites, whether political, economic, or financial, engage in criminal activity that is just as organized as that of traditionally known criminal circles (mafia, drug cartels, etc.) and is dangerous for social organization and stability. This “white-collar crime” covers the entire spectrum of active and passive corruption: bribery, unearned benefits, illegal benefits, influence peddling, illicit enrichment, money laundering, etc. The draft convention on combating corruption, adopted by the African Union in 2002, encourages States to implement useful and necessary legislative and political measures to curb this phenomenon. Among these measures, Daniel Dommel cites: “the criminalization of acts of corruption, the establishment of independent anti-corruption bodies, and the protection of witnesses to acts of corruption who may be summoned by the courts“. The criminal justice response to white-collar crime became necessary in the face of the growing number of scandals involving corruption and the embezzlement of public funds. In Cameroon, the creation of the Special Criminal Court in 2011 seemingly reflects the stated intention of Head of State Paul Biya in 2011: “the fight against corruption will continue and intensify, without leniency, without discrimination, regardless of the social status or political affiliation of the accused persons“. The Special Criminal Court (TCS) not only strengthens the existing system for prosecuting offenses related to the embezzlement of public funds and misappropriation of public assets, but also marks a decisive turning point in the broad-based effort to clean up public accounts and combat corruption and the misappropriation of public assets, launched by Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni in 2004. The TCS was established in Cameroon in two different contexts but for the same purpose: the repression of white-collar crimes: in 1961 and in 2011. The comparative study between the establishment of this court in 1961 and in 2011 allows for an analysis of the evolution of the policy for prosecuting white-collar crime in Cameroon (1) and for an examination of the specific characteristics of the 2011 TCS compared to the High Court, which had jurisdiction until then over offenses against public assets (2).

The evolution of white-collar crime repression policy: from the TCS of 1961 to the TCS of 2011

Comparative studies of the two approaches to prosecuting offenses against misappropriation of public assets reveal that both the Special Criminal Court of 1961 and that of 2011 were established to prosecute offenses against misappropriation of public assets. They emerged during exceptional circumstances in which the embezzlement of public funds had reached dangerous proportions for the nation’s economy and socio-political development.

The practices of the 1961 Special Criminal Court (TCS), though deemed repressive, ultimately had the effect of significantly reducing, if not completely putting an end to the embezzlement in question. However, regarding the TCS established in 2011, accusations of a political charade, political maneuvering, etc., obscure the need to put an end to the principle of impunity that has long prevailed in Cameroonian society. Yet financial scandals such as GLENCOREGATE, CANGATE, and COVIDGATE in 2021, in which billions were embezzled and the findings of the investigations remained secret and went unacted upon, seem to support the theory of “selective” judicial action, where some are targeted for political reasons while others face no consequences for the same reasons: support for or opposition to the current regime. While the Special Criminal Court (TCS) in 1961 enjoyed great freedom and autonomy of action, the 2011 model suffers from a deep-seated problem: the extreme politicization of its actions.

The specific nature of the Special Criminal Court (TCS) compared to the High Court of Justice in the repression of white-collar crimes

The law establishing this Special Criminal Court offers defendants, once they are found guilty, the opportunity to repay the embezzled funds in exchange for a reduced sentence or the dismissal of charges. However, this approach has not been truly effective so far because the defendants’ guilt and the evidence of their guilt have not been formally and indisputably established. And even when evidence is established, very few defendants commit to return the embezzled funds. The exceptions include Basile Atangana Kouna, Mendo Ze (during his lifetime), Yves Michel Fotso, Haman Adama, Roger Raoul Belibi, Joseph Mbita Bekono, and several others for whom the Special Criminal Court (TCS) has recorded the reimbursement of the embezzled funds. This procedure does not appear to have any real effect on the dynamics of embezzlement, and Mgba Ndjie finds the effectiveness of this approach questionable. If the State manages to recover significant funds through the restitution of the corpus delicti, these amounts remain negligible compared to the funds actually embezzled and invested in intangible and real estate assets.

Conclusion and recommendations

White-collar crimes can easily and effortlessly take on the appearance of legal transactions and are easy to conceal. Their hidden nature breeds impunity and encourages perpetrators to commit them more frequently and even to perfect their methods. In fact, impunity fosters fraud and white-collar crime because the lack of enforcement contributes to an increase in crimes of all kinds, and more specifically economic, financial, and political crimes. Combating “white-collar” crime involves intensifying sanctions against misconduct by the wealthy class in order to reestablish or restore a form of social equity. However, the penalties incurred do not seem sufficiently dissuasive. Imprisonment has no proven impact on the behavior of those responsible for granting credit. Perhaps it would be necessary to implement the provisions of the Penal Code regarding the confiscation of all movable and immovable property of the convicted person that constitutes the proceeds of the crime (Article 35: confiscation of the corpus delicti), and to repatriate assets held abroad. Furthermore, these legal proceedings must be conducted with the utmost transparency; indeed, in its Anti-Corruption Convention, the AU urges States to involve the media and civil society in all measures taken for this purpose.

+ posts

Pr. NGO TONG Chantal Marie is a Research associate in Governance & Democracy at the Nkafu Policy Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, obtained from the University of Nantes (France). Pr. NGO TONG is also a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ngaoundéré. She is a reviewer and co-editor of the African Development Perspectives Yearbook and a member of the Research Group on African Development Perspectives, Bremen since 2019.

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

12 + 8 =