The civic space allows citizens to freely exercise certain basic freedoms without hindrance such as, freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of assembly amongst many others. This space is essential to the vitality of democracy and the development of States, insofar as it enables citizens and civil society organizations to make their problems known to governments and to participate in the research and the development of solutions. For authors such as Helmich and Lehning, civil society merges with civic space: “civil society or “civic space” (…) shares with the State a conception of the public sphere and a consideration for the general interest and the good of all… ” ( 1 ). Civil society organizations (CSOs) are the keystone of this space, because through their advocacy, lobbying and political monitoring actions, they promote an exchange of ideas between governments and citizens, create a space for debate on laws and other subjects of general interest. Furthermore, CSOs bridge the gap between political representatives and citizens, so that the latter can voice their concerns without fear of reprisals.
Civil society, “an essential link in contemporary international cooperation strategies“, represent a bulwark against authoritarian excesses and carries within it a vast movement to challenge political modes of regulation, characterized by the absolute preeminence of the State. Over and above the theoretical and doctrinal difficulties involved in defining the notion of civil society, it should be noted that in the practice of all States, civil society exists and acts according to the political contexts and laws governing their activities.
The concept emerged in Africa in the 1990s upon the thought that “civil society would have a major role to play in the democratization and economic development of African countries freed from the yoke of single parties” ( 2 ). Its development is the result of a broad opening-up of the civic space within which it can deploy and play its various roles in favor of democracy, good governance and transparency in the management of public and private institutions (3). The African Union (AU) considers that CSOs are called upon to play ” complementary political roles ” ( 4 ), States clearly do not share this view, given the practices and strategies deployed to shrink civic space since the 2010s. The shrinking of civic space is a phenomenon that can be observed in most African countries. The degree of shrinkage varies from State to State. In some States, particularly those in Central Africa, the shrinking of civil society space is akin to a planned extinction of “the voice of civil society” and therefore of democracy, if we consider Roger Sue’s assertion that “civil society is the foundation of democratic rule” ( 5 ). In this context, how do CSOs survive and under what conditions do they continue their work? This paper examines CSOs in the face of government strategies and practices of shrinking civic space (I), on one hand and the implementation of resilience mechanisms and strategies (II) that facilitate the reconfiguration and survival of civic space on another.
Government practices and strategies for shrinking civic space
In 2019, Amnesty International expressed its concern about “the global repression of civil society organizations“. The repression denounced is carried out through repressive laws whose clearly stated objective is to prevent the full enjoyment of freedom of association, to curb the work of CSOs and their partners. The phenomenon thus observed by Amnesty International, already alarming in 2019, has spread widely and taken on dramatic proportions since then with restrictive and repressive measures resulting in the muzzling of civil society, arbitrary arrest and even assassinations of civil society members.
The muzzling or planned silencing of “the voice of civil society”
Restrictive laws, systematic bans on manifestations or “critics” of government action are instruments of repression against civil society. They constitute obstacles to the exercise of freedom of association, restrictions and criminalization of the right to manifest and to participate in a manifestation. All things contribute to “muzzling”, “silencing”, the “dissident” civil society. In July 2024, an order from a State authority in the Center Region of Cameroon threatened to ban from Yaoundé: “anyone who dangerously offends the institutions [of the State] or the person who embodies them” (6). The protests of the president of the Bar Council, Mr. Mbah Eric Mbah, against what he considers to be a “serious attack on fundamental freedoms “(7) did not dissuade René Sadi, Minister of Communication, from stating a few days later, that “it is unacceptable for compatriots, even if they are leaders of political parties or opinion leaders, to use irreverent, insulting or even offensive remarks towards the one who legitimately and happily presides over the destiny of Cameroon” (8). While it must be admitted that the defense of human rights and public freedoms should be done in strict compliance with the law and the institutions of the Republic, it should also be noted that the deviations in the remarks of one or two public officers cannot justify systematic bans on the freedoms of manifestation, association or opinion.
In Senegal, in June 2023, violent protests broke out in Dakar after Ousmane Sonko was sentenced to two years in prison. These protests were violently repressed by law enforcement ( 9 ). In Kenya, between March and July 2023, the authorities systematically repressed social and political protest movements, relating to inflation and the 2022 electoral disputes. This repression was manifested by the excessive use of force, the refusal to authorize protests and the amendment of the Public Order Act, thus limiting the constitutional right to peaceful assembly ( 10 ). It is in this context of restrictions on freedoms of expression, assembly, and movement that journalists, human rights defenders, activists and CSO leaders in Africa must operate.
Arbitrary arrest of civil society leaders
In a context of declining democracy where authoritarian excesses are increasing, participation in public life is becoming a real challenge. Emitting discordant sounds exposes one more and more to imprisonment, intimidation and sometimes disappearances. Arbitrary arrests, indictments under false pretexts such as: “hostility to the homeland”, “incitement to rebellion”, “apology for terrorism”, “apology for crimes and offences”, “aggravated disturbances of public order”. These accusations are all stratagems implemented in African governments to extinguish “the voice of civil society”. The list of civil society leaders arbitrarily detained and indicted under these pretexts has not yet been completed: Moustapha Tizi, Mohamadou Ballo and Ibrahim Oumarou in Cameroon ( 11 ); Jacques Sinzahera and Gloire Saasita in the DRC ( 12 ). On the issue of arbitrary detention, CIVICUS Global Alliance ( 13 ) notes waves of searches and arrests of civil society leaders. According to CIVICUS Global Alliance, civil society activists are victims of arbitrary and illegal arrests, torture and ill-treatment, kidnappings, assassinations, harassment and disappearances, all repressive practices of government forces and state intelligence services, to the extent that those CSOs that persevere in defending democratic values and human rights do so at the risk of their lives and those of their family members ( 14 ).
The assassination of journalists and opinion leaders hostile to the regimes
During the month of January 2023, we witnessed, in less than a week, the loss of three major figures in the defense of freedoms in Africa: Thulani Maseko, human rights defender in Eswatini, the Cameroonian journalist Martinez Zogo, and the Rwandan investigative reporter John Williams Ntwaliaux. The brutal and practically “savage” assassination of Martinez Zogo in Cameroon on January 17, 2023 hit the national and international headlines, bringing back memories of the assassination of Norbert Zongo, a Burkinabé journalist on December 13, 1998. A step twenty years back, testifies to the incomprehensible hostility of current African governments to guarantee and enforce fundamental rights and public freedoms, but above all to advance democracy. In such a hostile and traumatic environment, CSOs demonstrate specific engineering and pragmatism by deploying resilience mechanisms and strategies that enable them to continue to assume their political role (15).
Civil society resilience mechanisms and strategies
Resilience is neither a magic recipe nor a new way of working, it is a change in the outlook of civil society which, instead of blaming, must seek to understand and promote respect for difference and solidarity (16). According to the United Nations, civil society is structured around a “wide range of non-governmental and non-profit organizations that animate public life“. Civil society most often covers varied, fragmented movements, whose level of organization varies. It is therefore a wise recommendation that it organizes itself into a network to unite against repression. Networking civil society actors facilitates their redeployment and repositioning in a hostile environment.
The structuring and organization of CSOs in networks
From the common saying “unity is strength”, CSOs are inspired and tend to strengthen their international alliances and their presence in transnational networks (17). These collaborations make it possible to pool resources, exchange knowledge, share resilience practices and support each other in the face of pressure from local authorities. Partnerships with international organizations, academic institutions or other CSOs operating in less restrictive regions make it possible to transfer activities outside conflict zones while ensuring a certain continuity. This form of networking also allows local CSOs to benefit from international visibility and recognition, which protects them to a certain extent against direct persecution. By having relays abroad, CSOs are better equipped to draw international attention to situations of civil rights violations, thus promoting external pressure on authoritarian governments.
The redeployment and repositioning of civil society actors
CSOs benefit from new working methods through information and communication technologies (ICTs) and can therefore develop new working methods and strategies. Indeed, ICTs allow CSOs to continue their role of citizen control of state action by using online platforms. to ensure effective oversight of public services, actively combat fraudulent practices, raise awareness, mobilize and inform the public (18). Social media, in particular, have become essential tools for disseminating advocacy messages, organizing campaigns and drawing attention to causes that may being marginalized. Whistleblowers primarily use these digital communication tools to draw attention to violations of citizens’ rights and freedoms.
A better understanding of the processes involved in the development of a caring society leads to an awareness of the need to work and cooperate. In this sense, think tanks, private research institutions which for some authors are at the heart of civil society, are increasingly positioning themselves as “catalysts” for the networking of CSOs.
The primary role of Think Tanks is to supervise the political and economic information of the State and possibly to contradict it. The work of Think Tanks is mostly “a mix between the information and investigation research of journalists and the more in-depth research of researchers” (19). Their expertise positions them in the civic space as laboratories of influence (20).
Conclusion and recommendations
The shrinking space per general observations is seemingly becoming excessive. Serious attacks on freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of manifestation, and the right to information are all indicators of the obstacles to citizens’ political participation. Resilience is “the will and capacity…to resist the consequences of an aggression or a major disaster, then to quickly restore (the) capacity to function normally, or at least in a socially acceptable way” (21). Resilience thus defined raises questions and gives rise to many reflections: should we think of “resilience as a model for society?” (22). With reference to Coursaget and Haas ( 23 ), CSOs must organize themselves for a collective resilience based on the joint development of 4 capacities:
- planning work associated with the analysis and management of risks and interdependencies. This makes it possible to develop a flexible business continuity plan whose procedures can easily adapt to new changes;
- networking and interoperability between CSOs (mutual knowledge, smooth communication and information sharing, mutual understanding and mutual assistance);
- good communication and collaboration before, during and after the crisis (limit human filters and give importance to expert opinion, avoid apparent consensus);
- good crisis management organization for collective construction of suitable and adequate solutions.
In addition to these capacities to be developed and strengthened, CSOs have the responsibility and duty to exercise great vigilance in the use of ICTs. Therefore, here are some recommendations:
- Invest in protecting the information and digital identities of members of civil society. A mastery of encryption software, VPNs will favor secure communication platforms.
- CSOs could further invest in capacity building of its members to curb operational challenges in this context of shrinking public freedoms.
- All relevant stakeholders could work towards guaranteeing and ensuring the mental health and psycho-affective well-being of CSO members, in the face of stress, pressure and trauma by setting up psychological support programs, training in stress management and strengthening cohesion within teams.
Pr. NGO TONG Chantal Marie is a Research associate in Governance & Democracy at the Nkafu Policy Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science, obtained from the University of Nantes (France). Pr. NGO TONG is also a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ngaoundéré. She is a reviewer and co-editor of the African Development Perspectives Yearbook and a member of the Research Group on African Development Perspectives, Bremen since 2019.
JENGU Guy Beaudry est doctorant à l’Université de Yaoundé II, Soa et chef du département tendances et conjonctures du Centre Africain de Recherche en Sciences Morales et Politiques (CARES-MP). Il est particulièrement intéressé par les questions de sociologie des relations internationales et les études stratégiques.
